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**S E C R E T**

**SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE**

1. At the end of November or the beginning of December 1954 the Soviets took the initiative in establishing contact with the Central Committee of the Federation of Communists of Yugoslavia (FCY) in order to normalise the relations between the two Parties. The Soviets said in their written statements to the Central Committee of the FCY that the Soviet Communist Party had studied the accusations against Yugoslavia and Yugoslav leaders and had ascertained that Beria was to blame for the major part of events which took place. In addition, according to these statements, Milovan Djilas, as a member of the Yugoslav leadership, was anti-Soviet and in his attacks against the Soviet Union went so far that he acted as an anti-Marxist. With the removal of Djilas in Yugoslavia and Beria in the USSR, the main obstacles for collaboration had been eliminated, however, Consequently, it would be necessary to forget the unhappy past and establish close contact between the two Parties for the purpose of a full collaboration which had proved its effectiveness in the past. The Soviets pointed out that both Parties were Marxist and had the same aims.
2. In addition to the above approach the Soviets proposed several practical actions which could pave the way to the collaboration between the Parties along the Party line:
- a. The Soviets promised to disband all the Yugoslav refugee organizations in the USSR and Satellite countries.
  - b. The Soviets would discontinue all intelligence and "conspiratorial activities" directed against Yugoslavia.

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<b>STATE</b>	<b>X</b>	<b>ARMY</b>	<b>X</b>	<b>NAVY</b>	<b>X</b>	<b>AIR</b>	<b>X</b>	<b>FBI</b>	<b>AEC</b>										
(Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; field distribution by "#").																			

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- c. The Soviets would undertake certain necessary propaganda activities.
  - d. Tito would be invited to visit Moscow.
  - e. The Soviets and Yugoslavs should publish official statements regarding their rapprochement.
3. It is not known whether it was Tito personally or Kardelj who maintained contact with the Soviets for the purpose of discussing the Soviet proposals.
4. A few weeks after the Soviet proposal was received in Belgrade the matter was discussed in a meeting of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the FCY and the following answer was sent to the Soviets:
- a. The Yugoslavs were not responsible for the 1948 break. The Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party and not only Beria and his group were responsible.
  - b. The Yugoslavs broke off relations with the Soviets because the Yugoslavs did not agree in principle with the Soviet views and practice concerning the relations of the Soviet Communist Party and the Communist Parties of the Peoples Democracies. Still more important is the fact that Yugoslavs do not accept the Soviet views concerning the relationships between the governments of the Peoples Democracies and the government of the USSR. In Yugoslavia, Djilas was not a person of such importance that anything connected with the break of 1948 could be attributed to his personality, nor can the reasons for the break be attributed to any personality as an individual. The matter is much more serious; it is a matter of principle.
  - c. Yugoslavia as a state is deeply interested in the normalization of its relations with the Government of the USSR and neighboring countries and Yugoslavia will do everything that stands in its power to promote this type of normalization.
  - d. Under no condition would Yugoslavia accept the revival of the pre-1948 relations with the USSR because Yugoslavia wishes to be independent. The relationship between the Yugoslav and Soviet Communist Party is a secondary matter which will depend on the development of the relations between the two governments. The FCY wishes to preserve its full political independence and is willing to collaborate with the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party in the same way as it collaborates with the Socialist parties in Western European countries.
  - e. The decisions regarding the disbandment of Yugoslav refugee organizations, discontinuation of unfriendly propaganda, etc. were received with satisfaction. However, there are still other questions regarding Yugoslav citizens in the USSR and the Peoples Democracies which remain to be settled.
  - f. As a prerequisite to any further action regarding the Soviet proposal Yugoslavia requests that the leaders of the USSR admit publicly before the whole world their mistakes in regard to Yugoslavia. As far as Tito's visit to Moscow is concerned, this could not be even a subject of discussion at the present time. However, Yugoslavia would be very pleased to receive in Belgrade a top level Soviet delegation. This would be the most correct way of proving the sincerity of the Russian proposal.

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Both the Soviet approach and the answer of the Central Committee were kept secret.

5. For a relatively long period of time after the answer of the Central Committee of the PCY there were no known contacts between the Yugoslavs and the Soviets. Malenkov, under whose regime the action was initiated, was removed, and Bulganin needed time to come to this matter. During this period of time Molotov made a statement in a speech that Yugoslavia had deviated from the road it followed in 1945. Yugoslavia took advantage of the opportunity and reacted strongly, criticizing Molotov through the press.
6. Ten days to two weeks before the public announcement of the arrival of the Soviet delegation, a circular was passed to the members of inner circle of the PCY stating that the Russian delegation would arrive in Belgrade. The circular stated that this information must be kept secret until the publication of the official announcement. Thus the announcement was a great surprise for everyone except a few people at the top.
7. Following the announcement of the visit, about 800 members of the Soviet security service headed by General Serov arrived in Belgrade, first a small group and later a larger one. In their contact with the UDB (Yugoslav Intelligence Service) the Soviet security officers did not spare compliments. They stated that the UDB was an excellent police force which they fully trusted. They stated, however, that they did not trust the Yugoslav militia. The Soviet security officers requested that all the streets through which the delegation would pass be thoroughly secured. This included that all the windows on the buildings be closed and that a policeman be placed in each apartment which had windows facing on the street. Further the Soviets deployed their own men the way they wished and were allowed to move in the town as they wished.
8. The members of the Soviet security force wore civilian clothing with the characteristic Russian cut and could be easily recognized.
9. The UDB brought to Belgrade a large number of their men and militia men from all parts of the country.
10. The Russians brought with them several heavily armored ZIS limousines. Since Tito refused to ride in a covered vehicle, none of the Russian delegates rode in a ZIS.
11. A great part of the discussions and negotiations took place on the island of Brioni in the form of direct conferences between Tito and Khrushchev. Tito used to take Khrushchev in a car out for a drive which might last several hours. Tito did the same with other members of the Soviet delegation, but to a lesser extent.
12. Khrushchev is a likeable man who freely points out that he does not delude himself that he possesses a great knowledge of theoretical matters. During the trip through Slovenia, Khrushchev told Svetozar Vukmanovic-Tempo that the Yugoslav Workers' Councils were actually a mixture of anarchism and trade union system, because there was no way of ascertaining who was responsible. After Tempo's explanations, Khrushchev stated that the matter deserved detailed study, and the Soviet theorists knew nothing about it. Khrushchev concluded by stating that the Soviet system of running industrial plants and commercial enterprises is better for the Russians, if for no other reason than that they are used to it.

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13. At the first luncheon with the Soviet delegation Tito addressed his guests as "Gentlemen". Khrushchev interrupted him smilingly and stated: "Comrade Tito could as well call us 'Comrades', which is what we actually are." Tito replied: "That remains to be seen." This was met by general laughter on the part of all the guests and the luncheon continued in a very friendly atmosphere.
14. According to FCY members, Tito has made clear to the Soviets his stand regarding the further development of relations with the Soviet Union. Tito has allegedly stated that progress in the development of the Yugoslav-Soviet collaboration would depend on the Soviet relations and policy toward the Satellites, this being the ground on which the Soviets could prove the sincerity of their intentions. The Soviets allegedly promised that they would change their policy toward the Satellites to a great extent, but that such a change required time because of the sensitivity of the matter.
15. Despite the fact that the local authorities requested the attendance of the population to greet the Soviet delegation only the evening before they were due to arrive, the streets were crowded with people.
16. The instructions of the FCY organization that the slogans in connection with peace and active co-existence be shouted were not carried out. Party members and non-Party people hailed Tito and the Party ("Tito-Partija").
17. The people were satisfied that the representatives of the great Soviet Union came to Yugoslavia because this visit meant a Yugoslav victory in an unequal struggle and the proof as to "who was right". There were many who feared that the visit of the Soviet delegation might be the first step towards the return to pre-1948 relations. This fear is slowly disappearing, however.
18. The favorable attitude of the population toward the foreign policy of the Yugoslav Government is lessened by the very low standard of living which shows no signs of improvement. Large numbers of people attribute it to the high expenses connected with frequent travels abroad by Tito and other Yugoslav high-ranking officials as well as the visits of foreign officials to Yugoslavia.
19. Although the FCY members fairly satisfactorily follow the Party line, the low standard of living is a reason for general discontent which even the Party members cannot hide. However, the FCY members endorse the foreign policy of the regime and there are no signs of revival of pro-Soviet feelings among them.
20. The Yugoslav-Soviet conference in Belgrade caused a general demoralization of the Yugoslav Cominformists. Even those who secretly hoped that the internal situation in Yugoslavia would one day develop in favor of the Soviet Union remain disillusioned. Actually the Cominformists in Yugoslavia are politically finished. Now that the Soviets for whom they suffered have left them in the lurch, they have become innocuous.
21. The Soviet Union has now been given the same rights as the U.S. and other Western countries in the field of cultural propaganda. The Center of Soviet Culture (Dom Sovjetske Kulture) is active and its films, conferences and stage shows are well attended. The Soviet personnel in Belgrade are free to maintain social contacts with the population, and they take advantage of this freedom.

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22. Some Soviet personnel live in the building in which Mitra Mitrovia (former wife of Djilas) lives, and recently they started taking Mitra's daughter with their children to the Center of Soviet Culture.

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